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Flow-graph analysis of system calls for exploit detection
ABSTRACT
One technique of improving computer security is to test an executable for presence of
malicious code without running the executable. The present disclosure enables such detection of
malicious code by leveraging the observation that system calls (syscalls) are a main pathway for
exploits, since syscalls are an important way for a program to interact with an operating system
kernel. The disclosure describes techniques to compute a control flow graph for the executable
comprising only syscalls. A number of independent control flows are produced from such a
control flow graph. Graph analysis/matching techniques are applied to detect exploit patterns in
these syscall graphs, e.g., based on matching against known syscall exploit sequences for
different vulnerabilities. In this manner, a potentially malicious executable is detected and can be
isolated without exposing a computer system to damage.
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BACKGROUND
One technique of improving computer security is to test an executable for presence of
malicious code without running the executable. Examples of malicious code include code that
attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities within an operating system.
DESCRIPTION

Fig. 1: Detecting known exploit patterns in binary executables

Fig. 1 illustrates detection of known exploit patterns in binary executables without
running the executable. Static analysis is used to compute the whole-program control flow graph
(CFG) (102) for the given binary file. Whole-program means the CFGs corresponding to called
functions are embedded into the overall CFG such that entire system behavior is captured in a
single graph.
All instructions other than those resulting in system calls (syscalls) are turned into
no-operations (no-ops) (104). Syscall instructions include, e.g., architecture specific instructions
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such as SYSCALL, SYSENTER, SVC, SWI, etc., and also include call or branch instructions to
dynamically linked code, e.g., calls to known functions in dynamically linked libraries, identified
by their names.
The result is a control flow graph comprising only syscalls. This graph encodes a superset
of all syscall sequences that the given binary can result in. A number of graphs are produced
from the binary, each corresponding to a potential independent control flow (106). While these
are notionally separate graphs, since they are generated from the same executable, they may have
significant overlap. Techniques of graph matching via merging, described in [1], can be applied,
resulting in a single graph with multiple rooted subgraphs.
A syscall graph is produced for each entry point. Such entry points include, e.g., exported
functions for a library or the entry point for an executable, and any functions that are passed to
threading libraries to be run asynchronously. There is a one-one correspondence between graphs
and entry points such that each graph is rooted at a single entry point.
Example: An executable includes the function foo() which calls the function bar(), and is
defined as follows.

foo(){ bar();}
Both foo() and bar() are entry points. A graph corresponding to foo() is produced
that is rooted at “foo” and contains both “foo” (as the root) and “bar”. A graph corresponding
to bar() is produced that is rooted at “bar”.
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Depending on the context the binary is used in when it is executed, syscall sequences
from a control flow corresponding to a syscall graph may be interleaved, and multiple instances
of each flow can be interleaved with each other as well.
Since syscalls are the main way for a program to interact with the OS kernel, many
exploits rely on a particular sequence of syscalls to get the kernel into a particular bad state.
Different sequences or patterns of sequences can be found, constructed or evaluated to determine
whether they correspond to exploits for different vulnerabilities. Graph analysis and matching
techniques are applied to detect known exploit patterns in the syscall graphs (108). In effect,
specifications of a particular behavior of interest are matched against a superset of behaviors that
are extracted from an executable file of interest using static analysis.
Different software implementations exploiting the same vulnerability perform the same
actions, thus allowing detection of variations and different implementations of an exploit from
the same patterns. Static analysis thus allows all potential behaviors of a binary to be explored
efficiently. Analysis of syscall flow graphs allows specifically targeting program behaviors that
are likely to be involved in kernel exploits and that must be present in a malicious binary file.
In this manner, the techniques of this disclosure can be applied to analyze executable or
shared library files to determine if such executables include malicious code that attempts to
exploit known vulnerabilities. Such data can be used in making security-related decisions about
the executables. Online application stores or other platforms that offer third-party applications or
software can use the techniques to test software that is submitted for download or sale to
end-users. The techniques also find applicability in the computer security industry, e.g., within
anti-virus, anti-malware, and other security products.
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CONCLUSION
One technique of improving computer security is to test an executable for presence of
malicious code without running the executable. The present disclosure enables such detection of
malicious code by leveraging the observation that system calls (syscalls) are a main pathway for
exploits, since syscalls are an important way for a program to interact with an operating system
kernel. The disclosure describes techniques to compute a control flow graph for the executable
comprising only syscalls. A number of independent control flows are produced from such a
control flow graph. Graph analysis/matching techniques are applied to detect exploit patterns in
these syscall graphs, e.g., based on matching against known syscall exploit sequences for
different vulnerabilities. In this manner, a potentially malicious executable is detected and can be
isolated without exposing a computer system to damage.
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